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 Executive Summary  
 
Considerable speculation has surrounded the impact of the Good Friday Agreement’s 
provisions on human rights upon the Conservative Government’s proposals for repeal of 
the Human Rights Act 1998. This Policy Paper seeks to demystify this aspect of the 
debate over the future of the Human Rights Act, examining the terms of the Good 
Friday Agreement as an international treaty and peace agreement and explaining its 
interrelationship with both the Human Rights Act and the Devolution Acts. Once some 
of the hyperbole that surrounds the Agreement and its attendant domestic legislation is 
removed, it can be seen that the impact of the Agreement is in some regards more 
extensive than has to date been recognised, whilst in other respects the Agreement has 
less impact than some of the supporters of the Human Rights Act claim. Reform of 
arrangements so fundamental to governance in the UK should not be taken lightly, but 
at present the offhand treatment of the place of the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Northern Ireland settlement generates just such a 
danger. 
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Key Findings 
 
1.1. Human rights protections have been central to the Northern Ireland peace 
process. This is despite disagreement about the appropriate extent of human 
rights protections. 
1.2. Those in favour of repealing the Human Rights Act have diverse motivations, but 
the Northern Irish picture is not adequately reflected in the generalised anti-
Human Rights Act sentiment. 
1.3. The UK’s devolution settlement adds significant complexity to any reforms. The 
Sewel convention would require the consent of the NI Assembly before any 
repeal of the Human Right Act. 
1.4. The authority of the NI Assembly to legislate relies upon a functioning link to the 
European Convention and its accompanying jurisprudence. 
1.5. The Good Friday Agreement binds the UK under international law and is clear in 
its requirement for an ‘ECHR-plus’ arrangement for Northern Ireland. 
1.6. The UK must act in good faith when considering the potential impacts of 
reforms upon the Agreement. 
1.7. The Irish government is entitled to monitor and require performance of the UK’s 
obligations. It should make clear its position on any reform proposals. 
 
 
2.1 There is a complex array of reform options available to the Conservative 
Government. However, many of these options would put the UK into conflict 
with the Good Friday Agreement and/or devolution legislation. 
2.2 The UK Government needs to take account of the special legal and political 
situation of Northern Ireland in its reforms. 
2.3 Human rights provision in Northern Ireland cannot be handled as an add-on but 
rather must be the core of any proposed reforms. 
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2.4 Extensive consultation with the public and politicians of Northern Ireland is 
required prior to the enactment of reforms. 
2.5 The UK could avoid the difficulties posed by the Good Friday Agreement through 
a renegotiation of its terms relating to human rights. This option, however, is 
likely to generate near insurmountable political disagreement in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
 
3.1 Reforms to the Human Rights Act would not negate the UK’s responsibilities 
under a number of international human rights treaties. 
3.2 The potential of the European Union accession to the European Convention, 
means that the UK that remains within the EU might still be under the influence 
of the Convention. 
3.3 Far-reaching reforms to human rights in the UK could potentially result in an 
inter-state complaint between the UK and Ireland. 
3.4 The Irish Government holds significant ‘bargaining chips’ which it might make 
use of in fulfilling its role as a ‘guarantor’ of the Agreement and the peace 
process. 
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SECTION ONE – HUMAN RIGHTS REFORM IN THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONTEXT 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human Rights have been a central plank of the peace process in Northern Ireland. The 
degree to which shortfalls in enforceable human rights standards within Northern 
Ireland law exacerbated and sustained the Troubles
1
 is marked by the importance of 
human rights safeguards within the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (GFA).
2
 In the GFA 
‘many of the major players in the peace process picked up the human rights ball and ran 
with it’,
3
 with the result that the human rights commitments enshrined therein became 
a prominent part of the post-Agreement legislative settlement. Many of the rights 
contained within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) were incorporated 
into the law of Northern Ireland through the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (making these 
rights enforceable with regard to the legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and 
the activities of the Northern Ireland Executive) and the Human Rights Act 1998 (making 
these rights enforceable with regard to Westminster legislation and the activities of 
public bodies throughout the UK).  
 
Despite these developments the position of human rights within Northern Ireland’s legal 
order remains contested. Whilst human rights commitments enshrined in the GFA and 
have been a prominent part of the legislative settlement post-Agreement, the issue 
became a rallying point for the anti-Agreement faction within the Unionist community. 
This opposition drew upon Unionism’s long-standing associations with the political 
settlement resultant from the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 (and the place of 
                                                                                                                                                                
1
 See B. Dickson, ‘The Protection of human rights – lessons from Northern Ireland’ (2000) 3 European 
Human Rights Law Review 213, 214. 
2
 The Belfast Agreement 1998 (also known as the Good Friday Agreement). Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfast-agreement. 
3
 P. Mageean and M. O’Brien, ‘From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement’ (1998) 22 Fordham ILJ 1499, 1538. 
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parliamentary sovereignty within that settlement),
4
 but it was also grounded in 
antipathy towards judgments by the European Court in the course of the Troubles which 
were regarded as prioritising human rights concerns over security considerations.
5
  
 
The divergence between Northern Ireland’s two largest political parties can be seen in 
the following statements before the Northern Ireland Assembly on proposals to scrap 
the Human Rights Act. Sinn Féin’s representatives were uniformly critical of the 
proposals: 
 
It is … a direct attack on the Good Friday Agreement and the international treaty 
signed by the British and Irish Governments, which gives legal effect to the 
agreement.
6
 
 
Any repeal of the Human Rights Act will have enormous implications, particularly 
for compliance with the Good Friday Agreement.
7
 
 
DUP MLAs, by contrast, were broadly supportive of the reform, in line with the party’s 
opposition to the human rights obligations at the time of the GFA: 
 
The concept that the Human Rights Act 1998 was in some way central either to 
the Good Friday Agreement or to its passage by way of referendum is a high level 
of revisionist history.
8
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
4
 See A. Morgan, The Belfast Agreement: A Practical Legal Analysis (Belfast Press, 2000) 358-359. 
5
 For examples, see Ireland v United Kingdom [1978] 2 EHRR 25 (inhuman and degrading treatment of 
internees suspected of involvement in IRA activity); Brogan v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 117 (in 
which police pre-charge detention powers in Northern Ireland were found to breach the right to liberty); 
McCann v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97 (breach of the right to life as a result of inadequate 
planning in an SAS operation in which three IRA members were shot dead). 
6
 Caitríona Ruane MLA, NIA Deb, vol 105, no. 2, page 41 (1 Jun 2015). 
7
 Martin McGuinness MLA, NIA Deb, vol 105, no. 4, page 24 (8 Jun 2015).  
8
 Peter Weir MLA, NIA Deb, vol 105, no. 2, page 48 (1 Jun 2015). 
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[P]art of the reason for changes to the Human Rights Act being demanded is that, 
particularly in GB [Great Britain], there have been a number of instances where 
legal representations have been made on behalf of people who have been guilty 
of very serious criminal and terrorist acts and have used the Human Rights Act to 
try to mitigate their heinous actions?
9
 
 
For some years now, issues relevant to the Northern Ireland peace process have 
enjoyed multilateral support from the main political parties at Westminster. The peace 
process has benefited from this position largely (though not entirely) outside of the 
usual ‘cut and thrust’ party politics. Although it is not the express intention of the 
current Conservative Government to change this understanding, the effect of its 
proposals to repeal the Human Rights Act militates against the search for consensus on 
human rights issues in Northern Ireland. Efforts to repeal this Act at Westminster also, 
as the Equality and Human Rights Commission has identified, raises serious issues 
concerning Westminster’s relationship with the Northern Ireland Assembly and the 
other devolved legislatures:  
 
The devolution implications for any possible repeal of the Human Rights Act and 
replacement by a British Bill of Rights are complex given the degree to which the 
HRA is embedded in the devolution legislation. Even if the devolution settlements 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland do not represent formal legal 
impediments to any such proposals, it is likely that the agreed conventions which 
have emerged since 1998 would require the consent of the devolved institutions 
to any major change.
10
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
9
 Gregory Campbell MLA, NIA Deb, vol 105, no. 4, page 25 (8 Jun 2015). 
10
 Equality and Human Rights Commission, The Case for the Human Rights Act: Part 1 of 3 Responses to 
the Commission on a Bill of Rights: HRA Plus not Minus (2011) 86. Available at: 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/legal-and-policy/legislation/bill-rights/case-human-rights-act.  
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The confluence of the GFA’s obligations upon the UK, the ongoing insolubility of 
divisions between the Northern Ireland parties regarding the role of human rights within 
Northern Ireland’s governance and the relationship between Westminster and the 
devolved institutions has produced an ‘obscure yet systemic constitutional 
conundrum’.
11
 In this paper we examine these constitutional arrangements and their 
impact upon the proposals to scrap the Human Rights Act, focusing upon three research 
questions: 
 
[1]  What obligations does the Good Friday Agreement (as a peace settlement 
and international agreement) impose upon the UK Government with regard 
to reform or repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998?  
[2] To what extent does the UK Government need to act with the consent of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in reforming or repealing of the Human Rights 
Act 1998? 
[3] If the UK Government proceeds to act in contravention of these obligations, 
what remedies exist under international law or under the devolution 
settlement?   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                
11
 P. England and A. Barnett, ‘Why does the UK need a constitutional convention? An interview with 
Anthony King’ Our Kingdom (29 July 2015) Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/anthony-barnett/why-does-uk-need-constitutional-
convention-interview-with-anthony-barnett. 
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2. Pressure for Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The UK’s Human Rights Act was enacted in 1998 and entered into force in 2000. 
Although this development was part of a wider package of constitutional reform by 
Tony Blair’s Labour Government, a considerable degree of cross-party consensus 
attended to the Human Rights Act at the time. The consultation process on the Human 
Rights Bill was framed as ‘Bringing Rights Home’,
12
 and, as such, the legislation was a 
response to the long-recognised need to align the UK’s domestic rights protections with 
its international law obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
13
 
 
The inability of parties before the UK’s domestic courts to rely (directly) on the 
European Convention, or the European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence, before 
the Human Rights Act entered force had serious consequences. That an individual 
seeking to invoke their Convention rights had to take a case to Strasbourg meant that 
only those able to find finance, health and perseverance to go to the European Court 
could seek a human rights remedy.
14
 Not only was it harder for individuals to vindicate 
their rights, without the Human Rights Act rights-based disputes could not be addressed 
before they escalated to the European Court. As a result of the inability of domestic 
courts to resolve many rights claims, under the pre-Human Rights Act system the UK 
was the subject to many adverse judgments at Strasbourg. Far from transferring power 
to Strasbourg, the Human Rights Act therefore increased the human-rights role of the 
UK’s domestic courts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
12
 J. Straw and P. Boateng, ‘Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the European Convention 
on Human Rights into UK Law’ (London: HMSO, 1996). 
13
 The Secretary of State for the Home Department, ‘Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill’ 
(October 1997), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263526/rights.pdf. 
14
 Individuals, then and now, have to ‘exhaust domestic remedies’ before their case can be heard at the 
ECtHR. Pre-Human Rights Act, this often meant progressing through several levels of appeal before 
taking the case to Europe.  
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Notwithstanding this, dissatisfaction with the operation of human rights law led the 
Coalition Government to establish a Commission on a Bill of Rights in March 2011. The 
Commission deliberated for nineteen months at a cost of £700,000.
15
 The 
commissioners agreed that there was an ‘ownership issue’ over human rights, 
particularly amongst sections of the electorate in England.
16
 This disaffection is fuelled 
by sections of the media which are hostile to the Act
17
 and which perpetuate 
misunderstandings over the role and influence of the European Court within UK law. For 
example, UK courts are not ‘bound’ by the Human Rights Act to ‘follow’ the European 
Court’s jurisprudence. The Act instead requires domestic courts to ‘take into account’ 
Strasbourg’s case law.
18
 This provision has proved controversial, with the Conservative 
Party claiming that it ‘means problematic Strasbourg jurisprudence is often being 
applied in UK law’.
19
 Nonetheless, even where a UK court concludes that an aspect of UK 
law is in conflict with the Convention, it enjoys no US Constitution-style power to ‘strike 
down’ legislation. If a domestic court cannot read legislation in a manner which is 
Convention-compatible
20
 a notification known as a Declaration of Incompatibility will 
result.
21
 Only 20 such declarations have been made since the Human Rights Act’s 
introduction
22
 and the Government and Parliament are able to ignore declarations and 
                                                                                                                                                                
15
 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (Dec 2012) vol.1, para.1.23. 
16
 See The Commission on a Bill of Rights (n. 15), para 80-81. 
17
  Lord Faulks QC and Jonathan Fisher QC, ‘Unfinished Business’ in The Commission on a Bill of Rights (n. 
15), para 183; Lord Lester of Herne Hill QC, ‘A Personal Explanatory Note’ in Members of the 
Commission on a Bill of Rights (n. 15), para 232. 
18
 Human Rights Act, s.2(1). Roger Masterman argues that the act does not require UK courts to ‘slavishly’ 
follow or mirror the European Court. For a short briefing see; R. Masterman, ‘Are UK Courts bound by 
the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2014) Durham Law School Briefing Document, Durham 
University. Available at: 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/law/research/AreUKCourtsboundbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRigh
ts.pdf. For a fuller exposition of this argument see; R. Masterman, ‘Deconstructing the Mirror 
Principle’ in R. Masterman and I. Leigh (eds) The United Kingdom's Statutory Bill of Rights: 
Constitutional and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
19
 Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws’ (October 2014) 4. 
20
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.3(1). 
21
 Human Rights Act 1998, s.4(1). 
22
 Human Rights Joint Committee, ‘Seventh Report: Human Rights Judgments’ (4 March 2015) Available 
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201415/jtselect/jtrights/130/13006.htm, para 4.1. 
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maintain legislation that is incompatible with the ECHR. For example, successive 
Governments have chosen not to act upon a Declaration of Incompatibility on the issue 
of prisoner disenfranchisement issued some eight years ago.
23
 Even these limited 
powers have led to accusations from the Conservative Party that the Human Rights Act 
is an affront to parliamentary sovereignty, on the basis that UK courts, in the use of the 
Act’s re-interpretation provision, ‘have gone to artificial lengths to change the meaning 
of legislation so that it complies with their interpretation of Convention rights, most 
often following Strasbourg’s interpretation’.
24
 This complaint belies the fact that in 
doing so the courts as giving effect to the intention of Parliament as enacted in the 
Human Rights Act. 
 
There are also misconceptions regarding the number of UK cases that reach and are lost 
at the European Court. The Sun, for example, has reported that the UK loses to 
applicants in 3 out of 5 cases,
25
 whilst the Daily Mail puts the UK’s loss rate at 3 out of 4 
cases.
26
 Such reporting, however, involves a misreading of the statistics by ignoring the 
large number of cases rejected by Strasbourg as inadmissible. When these are taken 
into account the percentage of cases lost by the UK between 1959 and 2014 stands at 
1.32% (or about 1 in every 100 claims).
27
  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                
23
 Human Rights Joint Committee (n. 22), para 4.13. 
24
 Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws’ (October 2014) 4. 
25
 Adam Wagner, ‘No, The Sun, “Euro Judges” Do Not “Go against UK in 3 out of 5 Cases”. More like 1 in 
100.’. Available at: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2014/08/27/no-the-sun-euro-judges-do-not-go-
against-uk-in-3-out-of-5-cases-more-like-1-in-100/. 
26
 Adam Wagner, ‘UK Loses 3 out of 4 European Human Rights Cases? More like 1 in 50, Actually’. 
Available at: http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2012/01/12/uk-loses-3-out-of-4-european-human-rights-
cases-more-like-1-in-50-actually/. 
27
 Cases lost by the UK- 301, applications made against the UK - 22,781; Public Relations Unit of the 
European Court of Human Rights, ‘Overview: 1959-2014’ (2015) 7-8. Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Overview_19592014_ENG.pdf.  
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3. Human Rights and Devolution 
 
Two members of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, Helena Kennedy QC and Philippe 
Sands QC, noted that the negative perceptions of the Human Rights Act were not 
necessarily UK-wide: 
 
It is abundantly clear that there is no “ownership” issue in Northern Ireland, Wales 
and Scotland (or large parts of England), where the existing arrangements under 
the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights are not 
merely tolerated but strongly supported.
28
 
 
Human rights operate within the political context of devolution of power to institutions 
in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The generally favourable public disposition 
towards the incorporation of the European Convention within the domestic legal 
systems in these constituent parts of the UK, and ‘strong degree of opposition’ to 
proposals for their reform,
29
 may in part mark a collective differentiation from the 
dominant narrative in England.  
 
The GFA envisaged that the authority of the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate 
would be bound up with its compliance with the ECHR
30
 and that the judiciary would 
determine when Assembly legislation violates the ECHR (with any identified breach 
invalidating the legislative provisions in question). Under the GFA:  
 
The Assembly will have authority to pass primary legislation for Northern Ireland 
in devolved areas, subject to: 
                                                                                                                                                                
28
 The Commission on a Bill of Rights (n.15), para.88(v). 
29
 The Commission on a Bill of Rights (n.15), para.71.   
30
 Good Friday Agreement (n.2), Strand I, para.5(b). 
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(a) the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it 
which, if the courts found to be breached, would render the relevant 
legislation null and void…
31
  
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 in combination with the Northern Ireland Act 1998, 
presently uphold these aspects of the GFA.
32
 The Northern Ireland Assembly can 
legislate to build up rights protections within Northern Ireland’s law (in Wales, for 
example, the Assembly in Cardiff legislated to extend the protections for children’s 
rights, imposing a duty upon Welsh ministers to have due regard to the UN Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in their decision-making
33
), but cannot breach the minimum 
standard of the incorporated ECHR rights. 
 
This system does not mean that human rights are uniform in all parts of the UK. As Lord 
Neuberger, President of the UK Supreme Court, has noted:  
 
[E]ven part of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland, has a significantly different 
legal position in respect of important social issues such as women’s reproductive 
rights, blasphemy and gay marriage.
34
 
 
As we have seen, at a Westminster level, the Human Rights Act 1998 introduced, by 
mechanisms like declarations of incompatibility, ‘a delicate constitutional dialogue and a 
dance of deference between the judiciary and legislature but one where ultimately 
Parliament has the last word’.
35
 By contrast, where Northern Ireland Assembly 
                                                                                                                                                                
31
 Good Friday Agreement (n. 2), Strand I, para.26. 
32
 Northern Ireland Act, s.6(1), s.6(2)(c) and s.7(1) place the ECHR rights and Human Rights Act 
arrangements outside the Northern Ireland Assembly’s legislative competence. Under the Human 
Rights Act s3(2)b with s21(1), the Northern Ireland Assembly’s legislation is of a ‘secondary’ nature. 
See R. Gordon and T. Ward, Judicial Review & the Human Rights Act (Routledge-Cavendish, 2000) 15.  
33
 Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011. 
34
 Lord Neuberger, ‘Magna Carta and the Holy Grail’ (12 May 2015) para.7. 
35
 A. O’Neill, ‘Stands Scotland Where it Did?’ (2006) 57 NILQ 102, 106. 
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legislation conflicts with human rights, ‘the courts are supreme and are required to 
strike down all and any “unconstitutional” acts of the devolved legislature’.
36
   
 
Westminster also has the legal power to legislate within the purview of the devolved 
institutions. The UK’s constitutional arrangements are not federal, featuring strictly 
demarked functions and powers for respective levels of governance. As a matter of legal 
theory, Westminster has loaned its law making power to the devolved institutions, but 
its ability to legislate remains unabridged.
37
 This power has, however, been tempered as 
a matter of practice by constitutional convention. Here Lord Sewel, then responsible for 
piloting the devolution legislation through the House of Lords, set out the terms of the 
convention that would come to be named after him with regard to Westminster-
Holyrood relations: 
 
We would expect a convention to be established that Westminster would not 
normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament.
38
 
 
This expectation that Westminster will seek the consent of a devolved legislature before 
legislating is not enforceable as a matter of law, but any effort by Westminster to act 
unilaterally would be at variance with the nature of the devolution settlement. A major 
legislative imposition within the realm of devolved matters would be labelled 
“unconstitutional”, and would consequently risk undermining the relationship between 
the constituent parts of the UK.    
                                                                                                                                                                
36
 ibid., 106. 
37
 See Scotland Act 1998, s.28(7). 
38
 HL Debs., vol.592, col.791 (21 Jul. 1998). See also Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary 
Agreements Between the United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers, 
and the Northern Ireland Executive Committee (Oct 2013) para.14. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_betw
een_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf. 
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4. The Good Friday Agreement as an International and Bilateral Treaty 
 
The GFA involved both a settlement between the parties in Northern Ireland whilst also 
a bilateral international treaty between Ireland and the United Kingdom.
39
 In 
contemporary peace settlements this duality is not unusual, with state-only treaties and 
settlements having given way to inter-linked settlements between state and non-state 
actors.
40
 This shift might well reflect broader changes within international law but it 
leaves aspects of the concept of a ‘peace agreement’ under-defined and under-
explored.
41
 Thus, whilst the agreement amongst the parties in Northern Ireland was and 
remains extremely significant, this section of our analysis focuses on the Bilateral Treaty 
between the UK and Ireland. Its terms are covered by customary international law and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
42
 
 
The ‘Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (with annexes)’ comes firmly within the 
purview of public international law. That both Governments sought to have their 
bilateral agreement indexed with the UN Treaty Series demonstrates the intended 
‘international’ character of the Treaty and its binding nature under international law.
43
 
The annexed provisions referred to in this Treaty’s title include the ‘Agreement Reached 
in the Multiparty Negotiations.’ Annexes are considered to be essential elements of a 
treaty and are thus not less binding than the main text unless an agreement indicates 
                                                                                                                                                                
39
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of Ireland (with annexes). Belfast, 10 April 1998, 2114 UNTS 473. 
40
 A database of contemporary peace agreements is available at, 
http://www.transitionaljustice.ulster.ac.uk/peace_agreements_database.html. 
41
 Christine Bell ‘Peace agreements: Their nature and legal status’ (2006) 100 American Journal of 
International Law 373, 374. 
42
 Both parties are signatories to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, (1980) 1155 UNTS 
331. Although Ireland did not accede until 2006, by the mid-1990s at the latest the Vienna Convention 
had come to be regarded as reflective of customary international law; see I. Sinclair, The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (2
nd
 Ed, Manchester University Press, 1984) 5-10 and A. Aust, 
Modern Treaty Law and Practice (3
rd
 Ed, CUP, 2013) 10-11. 
43
 The title given to a treaty/agreement/protocol/convention is not relevant to its status under 
international law. 
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otherwise. The text of the Bilateral Treaty implies that the Annex ought to be 
considered binding upon the two Governments and itself forms part of the Treaty 
between the two states. The important text with regard to the commitments by both 
the UK and Ireland follows: 
 
(1) It shall be a requirement for entry into force of this Agreement that: 
(a) British legislation shall have been enacted for the purpose of 
implementing the provisions of Annex A to the section entitled 
"Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement; 
(b) the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex B to 
the section entitled "Constitutional Issues" of the Multi-Party Agreement 
shall have been approved by Referendum; 
(c) such legislation shall have been enacted as may be required to 
establish the institutions referred to in Article 2 of this Agreement. 
(2) Each Government shall notify the other in writing of the completion, so far as 
it is concerned, of the requirements for entry into force of this Agreement. This 
Agreement shall enter into force on the date of the receipt of the later of the 
two notifications. 
(3) Immediately on entry into force of this Agreement, the Irish Government 
shall ensure that the amendments to the Constitution of Ireland set out in Annex 
B to the section entitled “Constitutional Issues” of the Multi-Party Agreement 
take effect.
44
 
 
The material subject to implementing legislation in Annex A includes a section on 
‘Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity’. This section begins with the parties 
affirming a partial catalogue of ‘the civil rights and the liberties of everyone in the 
community’ which Austen Morgan characterises as having ‘no legal effect in 
                                                                                                                                                                
44
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of Ireland (with annexes). Belfast, 10 April 1998, 2114 UNTS 473, Article 4. 
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international, much less, municipal law; it is purely aspirational as between the political 
parties’.
45
 This section, however, proceeds to deal with the UK’s legislative 
commitments:  
 
The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the 
courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the 
courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.
46
 
… 
The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of 
human rights in its jurisdiction.
47
 
 
The conformity of the legislative arrangements enacted within the Republic of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom to the requirements of the GFA can therefore be evaluated, 
within international law, by reference to the terms of the Bilateral Treaty and its 
Annexes. International law provides two points of analysis for scrutinising the two 
countries’ obligations; customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). There is substantial overlap between the requirements of 
customary international law and the Vienna Convention and therefore the latter 
provides a convenient method of scrutinising the latitude available under the Bilateral 
Treaty.
48
 
 
Under the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, a core feature of treaty law, is the obligation 
borne by parties to act in good faith throughout negotiation and implementation and to 
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abide by an operative treaty.
49
 This obligation provides the basis for interpreting parties’ 
behaviour in conforming to treaty obligations.
50 
Once a treaty is in force, the parties – in 
this case Ireland and the UK – must act in good faith with regard to all elements of the 
Treaty. Not acting in good faith under international law would include the non-
performance of a specific treaty term, such as a requirement to introduce domestic 
legislation or constitutional change. Thus a failure to introduce legislation incorporating 
the ECHR into the law of Northern Ireland would have been in breach of the good faith 
obligations. By the same token, a subsequent change which undermined the 
enforcement of ECHR rights in Northern Ireland could also be interpreted as a bad faith 
breach of international obligations. States cannot invoke changes in domestic political 
structures, for example, changes in the political direction of the executive or legislative 
branches of Government (what Irish Senator Hildegarde Naughton termed ‘narrow 
sectional political reasons’
51
) to defeat this requirement or as a basis for its unilateral re-
interpretation. More generally, under Article 27 of the VLCT, states cannot invoke 
domestic law as a basis for failure to perform a treaty.
52
  
 
The Annex to the Agreement does not make specific reference to the Human Rights Act, 
rather it references the incorporation of the ECHR into Northern Ireland (see further 
section 6 (Option 1) below). How this obligation ought to be interpreted comes under 
Article 31 of the VLCT which requires a good faith interpretation based on the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty in light of its object and purpose.
53
 To ascertain the 
object and purpose, parties may not only use the terms of a treaty itself but also may 
also utilise the preamble and annexes (in the context of the Bilateral Treaty, the terms 
of the settlement contained in the Annex). Other relevant elements include instruments 
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made by one or more of the parties in the course of concluding a treaty and accepted by 
others as related to it, (which, in the context of the Bilateral Treaty could include the 
Human Rights Act’s legislative process at the time it was concluded). Furthermore, the 
broader context of a treaty’s operation may also be taken into account, including 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty. For example, although the Human 
Rights Act and the Northern Ireland Act do not incorporate the ECHR in its entirety,
54
 
notably not including the right to an effective remedy,
55
 Ireland has not questioned the 
fact that this substantial degree of incorporation satisfies the Bilateral Treaty’s 
requirements. Statements made by both Governments with regard to the 
implementation of the GFA through the passage of the Human Rights Act are important 
(subsequent agreements like the St Andrews Agreement of 2006 or the Stormont House 
Agreement of 2014 would have been similarly important, had their provisions related to 
the overarching human rights protections
56
).  
 
Article 32 also allows for the use of the supplementary materials such as preparatory 
work (travaux prèparatoires) and the circumstance of an agreement’s conclusion to aid 
interpretation of its obligations where their meaning is ambiguous or obscure, or if the 
Article 31 rules of interpretation lead to a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result.
57
  
Travaux prèparatoires have been widely utilised by international and domestic courts 
and tribunals in other instances. However, without either Government releasing these 
materials it is unlikely that these will become available until the usual 30 year time has 
elapsed for the release of Government documents.
58
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Interpretation is part of the performance of a treaty. As such, the process of using 
materials to interpret the treaty must itself be conducted in good faith by the parties to 
the treaty.
59
 On the face of the Treaty and Annex, these requirements of international 
law are not engaged beyond giving effect to the ordinary meaning of the text. Although 
the effectiveness of the Treaty ought also to be borne in mind,
60
 as the ordinary 
meaning does not lead to ambiguity, absurdity or to the defeat the object and purpose 
of the Treaty there is no need for recourse to the more complex rules of interpretation. 
The critical element will be to examine the intention of the parties as seen through the 
ordinary meaning of the Agreement’s text. 
 
The Bilateral Treaty and its Annex evidently envisaged an “ECHR-plus” arrangement for 
Northern Ireland, whereby the obligations and justiciability of incorporated ECHR 
provisions would ultimately be supplemented by the work of the Northern Ireland 
Human Rights Commission on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. If this is the case, any 
weakening of the degree of implementation of the ECHR (an “ECHR-minus” scenario for 
Northern Ireland) would appear to contravene the Treaty.  
 
The GFA’s ECHR incorporation provision must also be interpreted in light of other 
elements of the Treaty, including the requirement for reciprocal human rights 
arrangements imposed upon the Irish Government
61
 and broader commitments by the 
UK Government.
62
 As proposals for repeal of the UK Human Rights Act gathered pace, 
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Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs Charles Flanagan emphasised the reciprocity 
requirements under the GFA; ‘The Irish Government, for its part, took steps to 
strengthen the protection of human rights in this jurisdiction by enacting the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act 2003’.
63
 Beyond this, however, it has been argued by 
Christine Bell that the GFA’s reciprocity provisions commit the UK to human rights 
protections throughout the UK and not simply in Northern Ireland.
64
 
 
Within international law reciprocity is the acceptance that the obligations undertaken 
are balanced by the advantages gained and that this is mirrored by the other parties, 
(though not necessarily substantively the same obligations or advantages). Reciprocity 
does not necessarily require mirroring of each other’s acts or legislation and, as D.W. 
Grieg has pointed out, its operation is often very much related to proportionality.
65
 On 
the basis that different arrangements for implementation of the ECHR into law in the UK 
and Ireland were envisaged under the Bilateral Treaty, ongoing discrepancies in the 
levels of rights protections within Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland do not 
indicate a breakdown in the Treaty arrangements. Equally, however, it cannot be 
claimed that every adjustment in the standard of human rights protections will fulfil the 
Bilateral Treaty’s requirements of reciprocity. 
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5. Situating Northern Ireland within the Good Friday Agreement 
 
There is some complexity regarding the exact legal position of Northern Ireland’s 
political parties within the GFA. Although the negotiating parties
66
 reached agreement 
on the text of the document, the commitments within that document are only legalised 
between the UK and Ireland.
67
 Christine Bell notes that the 1998 “Agreement” is in fact 
composed of two agreements; the multi-party agreement and the inter-state 
agreement.
68
 These are respectively agreements between all of the negotiating and 
consenting parties at the Good Friday talks, and between the British and Irish states. As 
we have explained above, the UK’s obligations under the GFA in international law are 
technically owed to Ireland, the Agreement also recognises the interests of the 
negotiating participants and individuals of Northern Ireland in the fulfilment of its terms.  
 
There is a certain parallel with general human rights treaties in this regard. States 
parties to such international agreements do not merely owe obligations to each other, 
but also to individuals within their jurisdiction.
69
 Accordingly, action by the UK 
Government which violates the terms of the GFA is not only a breach of the UK’s 
obligations to Ireland, but also a violation of its commitments to the people of Northern 
Ireland. These commitments to individuals tend to be enforced in a much more diffuse 
way than would be the case with the commitments to other countries, but there are a 
number of monitoring bodies and organisations that will traditionally hold governments 
accountable for such breaches. In the Northern Irish context these bodies would range 
from the local to the international. With regard to the proposed repeal of the Human 
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Rights Act the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has already expressed its 
concerns,
70
 civil society organisations have issued statements,
71
 and the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee has been alerted.
72
 It is likely that other non-state bodies will 
also seek the enforcement of the Agreement, including the United Nations Human 
Rights Council, the Council of Europe and cross-border groups. These bodies are able 
individually and collectively to exert pressure upon the UK to comply with its 
undertakings.
73
 
 
Human rights undertakings form a substantive part of the various Northern Ireland 
agreements. The ECHR underpins several aspects of the GFA. The Agreement, reflecting 
the significant mistrust of “British values” and the UK Government by many within 
Northern Ireland, does not base itself in ECHR-equivalent protections (to be defined and 
solely adjudicated in the UK), but in the ECHR itself. This reliance on the substance and 
process of the ECHR was intended to put distance between the negotiating parties and 
highly-disputed rights issues. The Convention was seen as common – and neutral – 
substantive ground and adjudicative space.  
 
Later communiques by the UK and Irish Governments have built upon the GFA, including 
the Joint Declaration issued in 2003, which commended the progress made by the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act and discussed the extension of human rights 
protections beyond the ECHR.
74
 The St Andrews Agreement also reaffirms the 
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importance of human rights protections.
75
 In an annex dedicated to outlining the 
commitments of the UK Government relating to ‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and 
Other Issues’, the importance of the Human Rights Act to the peace settlement is 
manifested through a specific commitment to give the Northern Ireland Human Rights 
Commission additional powers.
76
 The (unagreed) final draft that resulted from the Haass 
talks in 2013 also placed significant emphasis on the ECHR as a touchstone of parading 
rights.
77
 Furthermore, the recent Stormont House Agreement indicates the continued 
centrality of the ECHR in the peace process. In the context of parades
78
 and the 
Historical Investigations Unit,
79
 regard for, and compliance with, the Convention are 
required. Elsewhere, the Stormont House Agreement affirms the need for mechanisms 
for dealing with the past are ‘human rights compliant’,
80
 and notes the role of the 
negotiating parties in promoting human rights values in lieu of an agreed Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland.
81
 It is clear that the treatment of human rights is not an addendum 
or extraneous to the peace process, but a thread that runs through it. 
 
This perhaps partially explains why, so far as Northern Ireland is concerned, the UK Bill 
of Rights Commission, established in 2011 under the Coalition Government, was 
equivocal about pressure on human rights in the Northern Ireland context:  
 
‘For example, the Human Rights Consortium said… “we also fear that a [UK Bill of 
Rights] could be used as an excuse to undermine or replace the Human Rights Act 
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itself, with the very real risk that the people of Northern Ireland will have less, 
rather than more, human rights protections post-conflict.”
 
… These views were 
echoed by many in Northern Ireland.’
82
 
 
In general, it is unsurprising that there would be substantially different socio-cultural 
attitudes to human rights within Northern Ireland. For example, many of the concerns 
that are voiced in England around the rights of ‘prisoners’ and ‘terrorists’ are differently 
situated in the post-conflict context. It also possible that the aversion to external 
influence often expressed in the English (media) antipathy towards ‘foreign courts’, is 
less prevalent in Northern Ireland as a region accustomed to (and indeed as a 
beneficiary of) international attention and cooperation on sensitive matters.  
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SECTION TWO – OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
 
6. An Overview of Reforms Options 
 
The position of Northern Ireland in any reformed UK human rights arrangements 
remains uncertain. In response to pointed questions on the implications of the Good 
Friday Agreement for the Conservative Government’s plans, Justice Minister Dominic 
Raab could only maintain that ‘[w]e will consider the implications of a Bill of Rights on 
devolution as we develop our proposals, and we will fully engage with the devolved 
administrations’.
83
 In this phase of supposed indeterminacy, in which the range of 
options below supposedly remain open to the UK Government, the 1998 settlement 
imposes significant constraints upon its freedom of action.   
 
Option 1 – Cosmetic Change 
 
• Replace the Human Rights Act with a “British Bill of Rights”, which retains the rights 
incorporated into the UK’s legal orders through the Human Rights Act and Devolution 
Legislation and retains the duty of domestic courts to have regard to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and the right of individual petition to Strasbourg.  
 
The 2015 Conservative Party Manifesto pledged to ‘scrap the Human Rights Act, and 
introduce a British Bill of Rights’
84
. The most limited way to give effect to this headline 
proposal would be a “rebadging” of the Human Rights Act which did not erode the ECHR 
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protections or the role of ECHR institutions. Such a reform would allow the Conservative 
Government to circumvent the legal and political difficulties surrounding the GFA.  
 
The Agreement has been read by some as requiring that the Human Rights Act 
continues in its present form.
85
 The Human Rights Act had already made some progress 
through the UK’s Parliament at time the GFA was concluded, which supporters claim 
implies that it would be the vehicle by which the UK’s human rights obligations would 
be fulfilled.
86
 The Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Charles Flanagan TD, recently 
informed the Seanad that the UK’s obligations were ‘given [effect] in the 1998 UK 
Human Rights Act’.
87
 The Human Rights Act explicitly provides that its reach extends to 
Northern Ireland, whereas Wales and Scotland are not mentioned in the text (being 
covered by implication).
88
  Under the text of the Agreement, however, the continued 
existence of the Human Rights Act itself is not required. The relevant section of the 
Good Friday Agreement reads: 
 
‘The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)…’
89
 
 
The Agreement therefore requires only the incorporation of the ECHR in Northern 
Ireland’s law (with certain rights being described as particularly important to the peace 
process), and not the enactment of the Human Rights Act per se. The substance of the 
connection established between Northern Ireland’s domestic law the ECHR remains the 
key to fulfilling the GFA’s requirement, not the legislative form. Indeed, given the remit 
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of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to draft a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland,
90
 the Human Rights Act was likely initially envisaged as a placeholder measure. 
 
Nonetheless, labelling any new enactment as ‘British’ would carry significant symbolism 
within Northern Ireland. Throughout the GFA, British and Irish are used dichotomously 
and as separated entities.
91
 In this context, regardless of the substance of such 
legislation, a “British” Bill of Rights would inevitably be perceived as partisan in its 
operation. Entitling the new legislation a ‘United Kingdom’ Bill of Rights avoids this 
specific incongruence with the language of the GFA but any national appellation within 
the legislation’s title is likely to remain a point of contention in the Northern Ireland 
context. 
 
Option 2 – Reforming the ECHR 
 
• Leave the UK’s domestic framework as it currently stands or engage only in cosmetic 
alterations such as rebadging the Human Rights Act. 
• Negotiate reforms to the Strasbourg system within the Council of Europe. 
 
The Coalition Government in office between 2010 and 2015 pursued the approach of 
reforming the UK’s obligations under the ECHR,
92
 using the UK’s position as Chair of the 
Council of Europe in 2011/2012
93
 to push for reforms to the European Court and to 
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demand increased respect for the principle of subsidiarity in its jurisprudence.
94
 The 
Coalition Government experienced success in this regard,
95
 and the Conservative 
Government could continue this path of reforming the ECHR in partnership within the 
Council of Europe with confidence that doing so would leave the Good Friday 
Agreement and the devolution settlements intact. 
 
Option 3 – “Breaking the Link” to the ECHR Institutions  
 
• Repeal the Human Rights Act and enact a Bill of Rights with broadly equivalent 
protections, but without requiring the UK Courts to have regard to Strasbourg’s 
interpretation of those rights. 
• Remain within the Council of Europe and the ECHR System. 
 
Opposition within the Conservative Party to the domestic courts’ adherence to 
Strasbourg case law has generated proposals to loosen the connection between the 
UK’s courts and the ECHR institutions. One of the objectives set out in the Conservative 
Manifesto was to ‘curtail the role of the European Court of Human Rights’,
96
 which has 
developed the ECHR rights under the “living instrument” doctrine to give them more 
extensive interpretations than would have been envisaged when the ECHR was 
drafted.
97
 This objective may prove difficult to achieve in light of the Government’s 
slender majority of at Westminster and in the face of opposition from within the three 
devolved administrations,
98
 so three different variations upon this option and their 
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potential impact upon the Good Friday Agreement are explored below. As noted above 
at section 4, the Good Friday Agreement requires the incorporation of the ECHR into the 
law of Northern Ireland.
99
 A degree of substantive incorporation would continue under 
the options discussed below, leading many Parliamentarians to assume that they will be 
compatible with the GFA’s arrangements: 
 
A new Bill of Rights incorporating all the original articles of the European 
convention and other British rights such as trial by jury would be consistent with 
the Good Friday agreement and would allow Parliament, not Strasbourg, to decide 
where the balance between rights lies.
100
 
 
Option 3a) 
 
• Modify the Human Rights Act to ‘break the link’ to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence as it applies to the interpretation of 
both Westminster and devolved legislation.  
 
The objective of breaking the link with Strasbourg jurisprudence 
implies maintaining in domestic law the rights set out in the 
1950 Convention, but resiling from at least some elements of the 
Strasbourg Court’s subsequent development of the ECHR rights. As scope already 
exists for divergent interpretations of rights requirements under the Human Rights Act, 
however, meaningful reform would have to either expressly prohibit reference to 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence by UK courts or render such jurisprudence purely ‘advisory’.
101
 
A proposal which attempts to ‘break the formal link between the British Courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights’
102
 is intended to draw a red line against any 
subsequent extensions of the ECHR rights by Strasbourg affecting the UK, on the basis 
that Strasbourg should grant leeway (in the language of Strasbourg jurisprudence, a 
“Margin of Appreciation”
103
) to the UK Parliament’s decision to restrict the ambit of 
human rights through clear legislation.  
 
In pursuing the goal of completely breaking this link, as it applies to both Westminster 
legislation and the enactments of the devolved legislatures, the Conservative Party 
would face considerable difficulties with regard to the current devolution settlement. By 
constitutional convention (the Sewel Convention)
104
 any Westminster legislation which 
modifies the devolution settlements for Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland or 
impinges upon the remits of the devolved institutions (engages a “devolution matter”) 
should be assented to by the devolved legislatures by means of a Legislative Consent 
Motion. A “devolution matter” is defined in the Northern Ireland Assembly standing 
orders as: 
 
(a) a transferred matter, other than a transferred matter which is ancillary to 
other provisions (whether in the Bill or previously enacted) dealing with excepted 
or reserved matters; 
(b) a change to –  
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(i) the legislative competence of the Assembly; 
(ii) the executive functions of any Minister; 
(iii) the functions of any department.
105
 
 
Restricting the courts’ ability to ‘take into account’
106
 Strasbourg case law would restrict 
their ability to assess whether the Assembly’s legislation is ECHR compliant. It would 
change the nature of the human rights constraints which bind the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. Breaking the link between Strasbourg and all aspects of the law affecting 
Northern Ireland would, therefore, undermine the incorporation of the ECHR into the 
law of Northern Ireland for the purposes of the Agreement. Attempts to impose such an 
arrangement from Westminster, without a Legislative Consent Motion from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, would also amount to an affront to the GFA’s institutional 
arrangements.  
 
Option 3b) 
 
• Modify the Human Rights Act to ‘break the formal link’ with 
the Strasbourg Court in respect of all Westminster 
legislation. 
• The existing incorporation of the ECHR as interpreted by the 
Strasbourg Court under the Human Rights Act/Devolution 
Acts would continue to apply to all legislation of the 
devolved administrations.  
 
The devolution issues which would blight any effort to impose Option 3a from 
Westminster were recognised even before the 2010 General Election, when Dominic 
Grieve QC pledged that a future Conservative Government’s “British” Bill of Rights 
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would not be imposed ‘against the will of devolved administrations in devolved 
matters’.
107
 If this pledge is to be respected then, given the opposition to the 
Conservative Party’s reform proposals in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, a new 
Bill of Rights would have to exclude matters within the legislative remits of the devolved 
institutions. As the obligations upon the devolved legislatures and executives stem from 
the Devolution Acts and not the Human Rights Act, such a reform would not generate 
the same constitutional difficulties as Option 3a. 
 
Were the current plans on ‘English Votes on English Laws’ followed through, this reform 
would create a regionally bi-functional Westminster law-making process. Both UK-wide 
legislation (in areas where law-making competence is not transferred) and England-only 
legislation would be covered by the new Bill of Rights. UK-wide legislation touching 
upon devolved competences (such as the UK’s current counter-terrorism legislation, 
enacted at Westminster and applicable throughout the UK despite criminal justice being 
a devolved matter), however, would require a complex legislative consent process, 
whereby the devolved legislatures might seek the application of the fully-incorporated 
ECHR within their jurisdictions. 
 
Whilst such a reform would respect the general devolution settlement, respect for the 
GFA as it affects Northern Ireland alone cannot be achieved simply by separating out the 
arrangements covering the devolved administrations from those covering Westminster 
legislation. The Agreement stipulates that ‘[t]here will be safeguards to ensure’ that 
‘neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe’ the ECHR.
108
 This emphasis upon 
‘public bodies’
109
 is a necessary part of the human rights arrangements under the GFA, 
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for it is through interaction between public bodies and individuals that human rights 
abuses will manifest themselves. In light of the opening words of the relevant paragraph 
5 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement, these requirements relate only to public 
bodies operating in, or in respect of, Northern Ireland (and not all UK public bodies).
110
 
Consequently, for public bodies constituted both under Assembly legislation and 
Westminster legislation which operate in respect of Northern Ireland, any reforms 
would need to retain protections equivalent to those in the Human Rights Act and 
Northern Ireland Act if they are to avoid conflict with the Good Friday Agreement. 
 
Option 3c) 
 
• Modify the Human Rights Act to ‘break the formal link’ 
with the Strasbourg Court in respect of Westminster 
legislation passed only in respect of England. 
• The existing incorporation of the ECHR as interpreted 
by the Strasbourg Court under the Human Rights 
Act/Devolution Acts would continue with regard to 
legislation of the devolved administrations, and in 
respect of Westminster legislation affecting the 
devolved jurisdictions. 
 
The problem created by the GFA cannot be resolved by any set of protections in a 
“British” Bill of Rights so long as those protections, insofar as they affect Northern 
Ireland, do not include a link to the case law of Strasbourg. Reforms which separated 
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out the arrangements covering the devolved nations and maintained the link to 
Strasbourg jurisprudence involved in the current settlement would, however, fulfil the 
requirement of the Good Friday Agreement that the ECHR should be incorporated into 
the law of Northern Ireland.  
 
Such an “England-only” solution might, however, still not deal with the devolution issues 
raised above if the Human Rights Act was to be repealed without legislative consent 
motions from the devolved legislatures. The Human Rights Act explicitly extends to 
Northern Ireland
111
 and is indeed entrenched under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
(beyond the competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly to alter).
112
 Its repeal would 
therefore alter the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly and, under 
the Sewel Convention, require the Assembly’s consent.
113
 Even if this was granted, this 
would not necessarily be the end of the Human Rights Act. Its repeal would remove the 
restriction on the competence of the devolved legislatures with regard to the ECHR 
rights. It would become possible for all of them to re-enact the Human Rights Act’s 
provisions into the law of their own jurisdictions.
114
 
 
For Option 3c to circumvent the need for formal approval, the Human Rights Act would 
have to be not repealed, but amended to confine its geographic extent to Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. To proceed with their reform plans on this basis, the 
Conservative Government will have to accept that the Human Rights Act will remain, in 
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an amended form, on the statute book, and that a “British” Bill of Rights will not extend 
in effect beyond England.  
 
Option 4 – Repealing the ECHR’s Incorporation with No Comparable Replacement 
 
• Repeal the Human Rights Act and ECHR-incorporation provisions in the Devolution 
Acts and either enact no replacement Bill of Rights or a Bill of Rights enforceable in 
UK law which are much more limited than the Human Rights Act. 
• Remain within the Council of Europe and the ECHR System. 
 
The three variations discussed in Option 3 are predicated upon the Westminster’s 
repeal of the Human Rights Act occurring in tandem with the enactment of a “British” 
Bill of Rights with broadly equivalent rights provisions. Whilst little detail of the 
legislative proposal has been released at the time of writing, this assumption draws 
upon David Cameron’s pledge, at the 2014 Conservative Party Conference, to replace 
the Human Rights Act with provisions ‘passed in our Parliament rooted in our values’
115
 
and the 2014 Conservative Party Policy Paper on Human Rights, which stated that ‘at 
the heart of our plan is a new British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities’ which will 
include the original ECHR’s text.
116
 Nonetheless, the vagary surrounding these proposals 
and delay in publishing a draft Bill means that we must consider the position if the 
Conservative Government opted to repeal the Human Rights Act without a replacement 
which includes a comparable catalogue of civil and political rights. 
 
Any attempt to return to the “pre-1998” arrangements for rights protection in the UK 
would entail conflicts with the GFA. The 2014 Conservative Party Policy Paper on Human 
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Rights talks up the fact that ‘over the centuries through our Common Law tradition, the 
UK’s protection of human rights has always been grounded in real circumstance’.
117
 But 
this tradition did little to curtail the litany of human-rights abuses perpetrated by the 
police, military and security agencies in the course of the Troubles and cannot substitute 
for the incorporation of the ECHR into Northern Ireland’s law. The common law may 
well have moved on since 1998, with an increasing number of appellate judgments 
emphasising rights inherent within the common law,
118
 but this does not substitute for 
the ECHR’s enumerated rights provisions. 
 
The ECHR system has also moved on since 1998. Conterminous with the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act, the jurisdiction of the European Court to hear individual claims 
became compulsory.
119
 If the UK wished to remain within the ECHR without a general 
incorporation of the ECHR rights into domestic law, it could not do so on the basis of the 
temporary grants of jurisdiction to hear individual petitions it had employed into the 
1990s (which could be used to exert leverage over the Court). Even if individual petition, 
and by extension the oversight of the Strasbourg Court, are now fixed features of the 
ECHR system, this does not suffice to address the GFA’s requirement for incorporated 
rights which can be employed before the domestic courts.  
 
 
Option 5 – The UK’s Withdrawal from the ECHR 
 
• Withdraw the UK from the Council of Europe and the Convention system. 
• Enact a Bill of Rights with some overlap with the ECHR but without a link to 
Strasbourg. 
                                                                                                                                                                
117
 Conservative Party, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws’ (October 2014) 2. Available at: 
https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/HUMAN_RIGHTS.pdf. 
118
 See, for example, AXA General Insurance Limited v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46. 
119
 ECHR, Protocol 11. 
UK Human Rights Reform and Northern Ireland 
 
39 
 
 
 
At the height of the 2015 UK General Election campaign David Cameron refused to rule 
out the UK’s withdrawal from the ECHR,
120
 even though he maintained after the election 
that ‘Our intention is very clear: it is to pass a British Bill of Rights, which we believe is 
compatible with our membership of the Council of Europe’.
121
 Discussing the 
Conservative Government’s plans before Parliament’s Justice Committee, Minister for 
Justice Michael Gove affirmed his ‘hope’ that the UK would remain part of the ECHR, but 
warned that ‘I cannot give a 100% guarantee’.
122
 We must therefore examine the 
implications of a complete withdrawal from the ECHR for the UK’s obligations under the 
GFA. 
 
This approach would constitute a show of bad faith from the UK Government with 
regard to the GFA obligations. The ECHR underpins several aspects of the Good Friday 
Agreement and other aspects of the peace settlement. Even if the Conservative 
Government enacted a domestic Bill of Rights containing equivalents of all or many of 
the ECHR rights, to be adjudicated upon by the domestic courts, this would not meet the 
GFA’s requirement that the ECHR be incorporated into the law of Northern Ireland. The 
Strasbourg Court is an essential element of the ECHR framework – indeed, the existence 
of such a powerful international tribunal with a highly-developed body of jurisprudence 
is what has, for much of its existence, marked the ECHR out as distinct from other 
international human rights documents which struggle with enforcement. The GFA’s 
human rights provisions are predicated upon a neutral, and mutually trusted, third party 
adjudicating upon significant human rights disputes. Ireland, having amended its 
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legislative framework in order to ‘incorporate’ the ECHR
123
 would also be entitled to see 
such a move as a significant violation of the inter-state element of the Bilateral Treaty. 
 
Whilst the ECHR’s colonies provision permits signatory states to exclude the effect of 
the ECHR from overseas territories,
124
 this provision does not relate to the core 
jurisdiction and could not be used to exclude Great Britain from the ECHR, whilst 
maintaining the coverage of Northern Ireland.
125
 Likewise, whilst the ECHR permits 
specific reservations, general reservations cannot be maintained to exclude wide areas 
of individual-state relations.
126
 
 
 
Option 6 – Exceptional Status for Northern Ireland 
 
• Modify the Human Rights Act to ‘break the formal link’ 
with the Strasbourg Court in respect of Westminster 
legislation affecting any of Great Britain and the 
legislation of the Welsh Assembly and Scottish 
Parliament.  
• Enact a NI Bill of Rights maintaining at least the 
existing standards of rights protection and Strasbourg 
link applicable to Stormont legislation and 
Westminster legislation affecting Northern Ireland. 
 
The prominence of the link to the Strasbourg institutions within the Good Friday 
Agreement precludes any effort to simply sunder the link to Strasbourg or withdraw 
from the ECHR without taking account of the special position of Northern Ireland. In the 
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previous options we have considered UK-wide approaches or approaches which treat all 
of the devolved jurisdictions in the same manner, given the attitudes towards the 
current human rights arrangements in these parts of the UK and the similar nature of 
their systems of governance. The Good Friday Agreement, however, requires the 
‘incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)’.
127
 As a result, we must consider the possibility of whether compliance could be 
achieved by establishing a separate regime for Northern Ireland’s ‘particular political 
situation’,
128
 and the difficulties inherent in an effort to separate out Northern Ireland 
from the model of rights protection governing the other devolved nations.  
 
Some of the published Conservative Party thinking on the replacement for the Human 
Rights Act has proceeded on the basis of a separate regime for Northern Ireland. As 
Dominic Grieve QC acknowledged in 2009, ‘I can see no reason … why our UK Bill of 
Rights should not make special provision for Northern Ireland to reflect its need to 
tackle the particular circumstances there’.
129
 Much as the subsequent shift to the less-
considered term “British Bill of Rights” and dismissal of Grieve from the Office of 
Attorney General in 2014 might be taken to mark the marginalisation of his position on 
Northern Ireland,
130
 in legal terms a separate regime for Northern Ireland (not the 
“tagging on” of some Northern Ireland provisions to a UK-wide scheme
131
) would 
provide the most direct means of addressing the GFA’s requirements.  
 
The sections of the Agreement that discuss a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights affirm that 
no matter what ‘supplementary’ protections might be added in such a process, the 
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baseline of the relationship between the law of Northern Ireland and the ECHR should 
be maintained.
132
 Even if this requirement is addressed, this solution would not 
necessarily facilitate the navigation of the constitutional concerns which mark out 
Westminster’s relations with the devolved administrations. The NIHRC’s proposals for a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland
133
 floundered upon the opposition of the Unionist 
Parties to extensions to the rights protections available within Northern Ireland. Under 
the Coalition Government the NIO refused to proceed with the Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland without consensus amongst the main parties in Northern Ireland: 
 
[A] legislative consent motion must be passed by the assembly in circumstances 
where the government brings forward any legislation at Westminster such as a Bill 
of Rights which will have a significant impact on devolved policy. … The British 
government is happy to move, but there is no point in moving until we have 
achieved some sort of consensus which is very much lacking at the moment.
134
 
 
For his part in this constitutional game of pass the parcel, First Minister Peter Robinson 
has maintained that ‘responsibility of a Bill of Rights lies with the UK Government’.
135
 
Now that it is looking for a means to unpick the human rights element in the Northern 
Ireland peace settlement from UK-wide human rights arrangements the Conservative 
Party might well regret its disinterest in the NIHRC proposals and the failure to address 
general human rights arrangements within the Stormont House Agreement.  
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Just as the Assembly divided 46-42 against Bill of Rights proposals in 2011,
136
 with the 
Unionist Parties blocking extensions to the rights protections in Northern Ireland, so to 
might the Nationalist Parties reject a legislative consent motion which sought to 
separate out Northern Ireland’s human rights protections in the context of diminishing 
the role for human rights in the UK as a whole.
137
 Rights abuses against Irish people in 
the UK as a whole (such as the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four), and not simply in 
Northern Ireland, retain their totemic place in nationalist consciousness. Whilst, as we 
conclude above, UK-wide arrangements were not legally required by the GFA 
arrangements, the Nationalist Parties could make a cogent claim that their agreement of 
the Northern Ireland arrangements came in the context of the Human Rights Act. There 
would be little which could incentivise them to abandon their settled position in favour 
of extended human rights protections and their view that Northern Ireland 
arrangements ‘cannot be covered by a UK Bill of Rights’.
138
  
 
The consociationalism provisions of the Northern Ireland Act allow Sinn Féin and the 
SDLP to block a legislative consent motion even if they are in a minority.
139
 An attempt 
by Westminster to ignore such an outcome (as the restraint upon Parliament’s action 
rests in constitutional convention and not law) would likely have serious destabilising 
effects upon Northern Ireland’s institutions. In sum, separating Northern Ireland’s 
human rights regime out from the remainder of the UK will not practically allow the 
Conservative Government circumvent the problems posed by Northern Ireland for their 
manifesto proposals on human rights. 
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7. Modification to the Good Friday Agreement 
 
An alternate way to circumvent the Good Friday Agreement’s restrictions on human 
rights reform would be for the UK Government to seek to renegotiate the human rights 
terms of the settlement. Treaties are, of course, not set in stone. Successor treaties, 
treaty amendments, engagement of severability provisions and fundamental changes in 
circumstance all provide recognised means by which the binding character of some or 
all of a treaty like the Bilateral Treaty can be altered. This, however, does not take 
account of the political questions which form part of the broader context of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. 
 
The first issue arises with regard to the relationship between successor and predecessor 
treaties. While the Irish Government was present at the negotiation of the St. Andrews 
Agreement in 2006,
140
 in the end the Agreement was concluded between the UK 
Government and the parties in Northern Ireland. This means that the Irish Government 
is not a party to this Agreement. However, in being present, Ireland would be regarded 
as having acquiesced to the amendments made to the GFA arrangements. Annex B of 
the St. Andrews Agreement, regarding human rights, specifically references the Human 
Rights Act, but does not mention the ECHR (putting into context the degree to which the 
Human Rights Act has come in practice to underpin the human rights aspects of the 
1998 settlement). The language of Annex B appears to follow the GFA in regarding the 
ECHR as a human rights baseline and that in the specific context of Northern Ireland a 
form of “ECHR-plus” would be employed in the development of a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights by the Bill of Rights Forum.  
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The St. Andrews Agreement can be understood as subsequent practice of the UK and 
Irish Governments in understanding the implementation of their Bilateral Treaty and, as 
such, seems to reinforce the role of the ECHR, rather than undermining it. Article 59 of 
the VCLT allows treaties to be suspended or terminated, which as a matter of law 
remains an option available to both Governments.
141
 The VCLT also allows for successive 
treaties, an option which is particularly straightforward with regard to bilateral treaties 
and which the Irish and UK Governments have employed since the establishment of the 
Free State in 1921.
142
 In the circumstance of suspension or termination, the Bilateral 
Treaty including the Annex would be suspended or terminated, but the GFA as a political 
agreement within Northern Ireland would stand. Its political position would instead 
become a UK constitutional issue between the devolved Government and Westminster 
rather than a question of international law. In the circumstance of a successive treaty 
(as with the Anglo-Irish Agreement before) the Bilateral Treaty and Annex could be 
terminated between the two Governments and replacement terms agreed between the 
two parties. Nonetheless, it is extremely unlikely that such a change would be 
attempted without the consent of the Northern Ireland political parties. 
 
The VCLT allows for the amendment of treaties. One of the issues arising from this 
option is that it is the Annex to the Treaty that requires amendment rather than the 
main part of the document. This Annex was of course subject to intense negotiation in 
Northern Ireland and thus, whilst international law would allow for its amendment, the 
political viability of such a course of action is a separate issue (in this regard, 
amendment would take place in the context of the emergent lex post bellum or lex 
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pacificatoria).
143
 This pre-supposes that the Irish Government would be open to an 
amendment that would change obligation of the ‘ECHR-plus’ protection to one of 
‘ECHR-minus’. The Irish Government, however, has affirmed that it regards the human 
rights provisions of the GFA as ‘clear and unchanged’: 
 
The protection of human rights in Northern Ireland law, predicated on the 
European Convention of Human Rights, is one of the key principles underpinning 
the Agreement. As a guarantor of the Good Friday Agreement, the Government 
takes very seriously its responsibility to safeguard its institutions and principles.
144
 
 
The VLCT allows for the separability of treaty provisions.
145
 Under certain circumstances, 
clauses can be separated from the remainder of the treaty and its application. This can 
occur when these provisions were not regarded as essential or the continued 
performance of the treaty without these provisions would not be unjust. Such a claim 
could not be sustained with regard to the GFA as human rights protection was a 
fundamental element of the negotiation which generated reciprocal action in Ireland. 
 
Under the VCLT the UK could attempt to argue that human rights reform is necessitated 
by a fundamental change in circumstances.
146
 However, as Anthony Aust points out, due 
to historic abuse of this particular element of customary international law in the inter-
war period, this ground is now extremely narrowly drawn.
147
 In particular, a state 
cannot invoke its own conduct as a change in circumstances and it is highly unlikely that 
a change of Government or policy could be relied upon unless this reflected a 
fundamental change of circumstances in the UK. Such a change has not occurred since 
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the conclusion of the treaty that would be sufficient to invoke this article. Consequently, 
beside a major “constitutional moment” (such as a revolution), neither the UK nor Irish 
Governments could rely on this provision to terminate their obligations. 
 
As such, whilst it is possible to pass a subsequent treaty, or to amend or sever provisions 
of the Bilateral Treaty, it is not possible to do this unilaterally in the present 
circumstances. Any modifications must be done through re-negotiation with the Irish 
Government and, given the circumstances of the GFA, in tandem with the parties in 
Northern Ireland. It would be near-impossible to reopen the human rights element of 
the 1998 settlement in isolation from other aspects of the Agreement. If, in spite of 
these obligations the UK did proceed to act unilaterally, several options would become 
available to Ireland under the VLCT.
148
 If it considered the unilateral act to be a material 
breach – which is a valid interpretation of such action - Ireland would be entitled to 
terminate or suspend the whole or part of the treaty. Whilst the GFA’s Bilateral Treaty 
includes no dispute settlement clause several options remain open to Ireland if it 
believes the UK to be in violation of the Agreement.  
 
One of the more obvious options – an action before the International Court of Justice – 
does not appear to be a possibility. Both states, in making their declarations of 
compulsory jurisdiction (the formal recognition of the Court’s authority), have included 
qualifications that could be interpreted as excluding the other.
149
 The Irish Government 
has the most evident exclusion, which allows for all disputes to be heard at the 
International Court except those that arise between it and the UK with regard to 
Northern Ireland. The UK’s declaration is slightly more open in that it states ‘any dispute 
with the government of any other country which is or has been a Member of the 
Commonwealth.’  
                                                                                                                                                                
148
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149
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Whether the UK’s exclusion would include Ireland is questionable. The Commonwealth 
is a sui generis organisation and if this clause were to be extensively interpreted it would 
include a vast number of countries which were once part of the British Empire. Which 
countries are considered a part of the ‘Commonwealth’ changes depending on the 
definition one uses. One definition of the Commonwealth can be interpreted to exclude 
those countries which were not part of the organisation in 1949 when the London 
Declaration made all member states “free and equal”.
150
 Ireland had passed the 
Republic of Ireland Act 1948 which came into effect 10 days before the London 
Declaration, thus it had left the Commonwealth before its modern incarnation.  In any 
case, however, the Irish Government’s declaration does appear to exclude an ICJ case 
with the UK regarding Northern Ireland. Although the Irish Government could choose to 
revoke its declaration, the UK could argue that it relied on the Irish Government’s 
declaration in its dealings with the country including the GFA. This position is made 
more difficult by the date of Ireland’s declaration of compulsory jurisdiction, which took 
place after the GFA negotiations. 
 
Beyond the ICJ, remedies for breach may be available through the Law of State 
Responsibility. The International Law Commission’s 2001 Articles on State Responsibility 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts have not been adopted as a treaty, though they are 
now largely regarded as reflecting binding customary international law.
151
 An 
international wrongful act can be an act or omission which is attributable to a state and 
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation owed by that state. The 
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 London Declaration 26 April 1949, available at: 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-
items/documents/London%20Declaration%20of%201949.pdf It lists, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) as members. 
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Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 
 2001, GA Resolution A/56/10, available at: 
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internal conditions or domestic law of a country are irrelevant to a determination of a 
breach.
152
 The Bilateral Treaty imposes international obligations upon the UK, and any 
of the options for human rights reform which we indicated above would breach these 
obligations would trigger the Law of State Responsibility. 
 
Under international law, the injury to Ireland would include both material and moral 
damage, which are subject to reparations including restitution, compensation and or 
satisfaction.
153
 Ultimately if a state refuses to acknowledge its breach or provide 
reparations, the injured state can invoke proportionate ‘countermeasures’.
154
 Even if it 
is difficult to imagine such a collapse in relations between the UK and Ireland, if the UK 
does proceed to act unilaterally international law does not leave Ireland without 
recourse in such circumstances.
155
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8. Negotiating a New ‘British-Irish Human Rights Protocol’ 
 
If the UK Government is not to fall foul of the obligations owed to Ireland under 
international law with regard to Northern Ireland and human rights in the course of the 
more far-reaching reform options which we have set out above, it will have to engage in 
a process of treaty renegotiation with regard to the 1998 settlement. The precedent for 
this process came in 2004, when, as a result of the citizenship referendum in Ireland, 
changes to Ireland’s Constitution instituted in response to the GFA
156
 were in part 
reversed. To maintain its international obligations, the Irish Government first sought the 
UK Government’s agreement that ‘that this proposed change to the Constitution is not a 
breach of the … Agreement or the continuing obligation of good faith in the 
implementation of the said Agreement’.
157
  
 
Although comparatively simple in legal terms, negotiating a new British-Irish Human 
Rights Protocol would undoubtedly face serious political challenges. Both Governments 
would operate under the pressure of perceptions from various constituencies, notably 
the Northern Ireland parties. The Irish Government’s actions in renegotiations would 
attract pressure from the public in both the Republic and Northern Ireland. A key 
element of the settlement has been the inclusion of Northern Ireland’s politicians in 
British-Irish negotiations which affect the region. In 2004 it is notable that the British-
Irish Interpretive Declaration was negotiated in the absence of the Northern Ireland 
parties (and over the opposition of the SDLP and Sinn Féin). At the time, Mark Durkan 
alleged that ‘[t]he DUP can now cite a precedent which they can say shows you can 
unilaterally change, vary and alter the agreement, even going to its constitutional 
core’.
158
  This claim, however, fails to take account of Interpretive Declaration’s 
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 Constitution of Ireland, Nineteenth Amendment. 
157
 Citizenship Referendum: Interpretative Declaration by the Irish and British Governments regarding the 
British Irish Agreement, available at: http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/IRE%20Citizenship%20Referendum%20Interpretation.pdf. 
158
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significance in international law. The centre of his complaint is that the Northern Ireland 
parties were not also involved. Much as they were excluded from the drafting of the 
Interpretive Declaration, negotiations on a new British-Irish Human Rights Protocol 
would be highly unlikely to follow this pattern. On an issue as central to the GFA as 
human rights, side-lining the democratically-elected representatives in Northern Ireland 
could not be countenanced by the Irish Government. 
 
As noted above, the Northern Ireland parties’ attitudes towards the human rights 
elements of the 1998 settlement are by no means uniform, with the DUP maintaining a 
stance as hostile to these provisions as they had presented in 1998. There seems no 
obvious route towards cross-party agreement on renegotiation. As such, although 
renegotiating the human rights elements of the 1998 settlement are a precursor to 
efforts to repeal the Human Rights Act, the necessary inclusion of Northern Ireland’s 
parties in such negotiations will generate near insurmountable political difficulties. 
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SECTION THREE – CONSEQUENCES AND COMPLEXITIES 
 
9. International Human Rights Obligations 
 
The ‘State’ of the UK, in its international law meaning as ‘a single undivided entity’,
159
 is 
obligated to protect human rights under a number of voluntarily ratified international 
human rights treaties in addition to the European Convention.
160
 This means in effect 
that the central Government bears the responsibility for failures to protect and promote 
enumerated human rights whether or not the failure is directly attributable to central 
Government.
161
 In this area at least, the geography of the reforms is simple. Whether 
the reforms affect one or all of the nations, the central Government will bear de facto 
responsibility for these treaty obligations. The UK’s performance of these obligations is 
monitored on a periodic basis, and specialised United Nations committees make 
recommendations to the State.
162
 The continuing and many imperfections in the UK’s 
implementation of these obligations will not be dealt with here. 
 
However, the proposed reforms to the Human Rights Act have potential to affect in a 
novel way the fulfilment of the UK’s international human rights obligations. As the 
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primary vehicle for the realisation of human rights in the UK,
 163
 substantial 
modifications to the Human Rights Act might affect the UK’s international obligations. 
Examples of where modifications to the Human Rights Act would result in probable 
violations of the UK’s international human rights obligations would be where the rights 
of prisoners were reduced, rights protections were removed from armed forces, or 
where safeguards were removed on the deportation of individuals to potentially abusive 
countries.
164
 
 
Another proposal, which envisages ‘breaking the formal link’
165
 to the European Court of 
Human Rights or to the Convention itself would not in itself entail a violation of the UK’s 
international human rights obligations. Instead, the UN human rights committees would 
look to the substance of rights protections, carefully scrutinising the level of rights 
entitlements and highlighting areas where rights standards had fallen below the level 
expected by the international treaties. Even without the incorporation of the ECHR or 
the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence, it is possible that domestic courts and common 
law rights could be used to maintain a level of rights protections that prevent the UK 
falling foul of its international human rights obligations.
166
 
 
Although breaking the link to the European Court or Convention would not violate the 
UK’s international human rights obligations, it would be of high symbolic significance. 
The European Convention system is generally held in very high regard internationally, 
and this includes at the UN human rights bodies. In some areas there is a substantial 
overlap between the standards used at the UN Human Rights Committee and at the 
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 The Human Rights Act is especially relevant to the implementation of civil and political rights, however 
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European Court. Denunciation or side-lining of the European system in (parts of) the UK 
would consequently also be viewed as indicative of a weakening commitment to the 
international system of human rights protections. 
 
It would also be against the recommendations of many independent experts who 
monitor the UN human rights system. On the right to housing,
167
 women’s rights,
168
 
socio-economic rights,
169
 the rights of disabled persons,
170
 racial discrimination,
171
 
children’s rights
172
 and on traditional civil and political rights,
173
 experts have noted the 
need for increased efforts and protections in the UK – not reductions in these 
protections. 
 
Neither (as the argument sometimes runs) are these recommendations for improved 
human rights protection only emanating from a ‘human rights elite’. A major politically 
constituted body at the UN – the Human Rights Council – made up of representatives 
from 47 countries including Ireland and the UK has also made recommendations to the 
UK that indicate the need for increased rights protections.
174
 This body is not comprised 
of human rights experts (or elites), but rather can be seen as indicative of global political 
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feeling on a country’s rights protections.
175
 The Good Friday Agreement, in addition to 
the primary obligation of ECHR incorporation, also includes a focus on these broader 
rights issues.
176
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10. An Inter-State Complaint before Strasbourg 
 
Many human rights treaties contain within them a procedure allowing states to bring 
complaints against one another.
177
 Depending on the human rights treaty, this 
procedure is rarely, if ever, used.
178
 However the European Convention system has 
heard some such cases. An interesting and relevant example is the Ireland v UK case
179
 
(the ‘Hooded Men’ case) brought by the Irish Government in relation to claims of 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in Northern Ireland. Ireland’s 
ongoing commitment to maintaining human rights standards throughout the island of 
Ireland was reaffirmed when it requested that the ‘Hooded Men’ case be re-opened 
following the discovery of new evidence.
180
 The re-opening of cases is rare,
181
 and this 
example is especially exceptional in light of the now close relationship between the UK 
and Ireland.
182
 Nonetheless, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Charles Flanagan TD, 
justified this action on the basis that the ‘suffering of the individual men and of their 
families, … the significance of this case, and … the weight of these allegations’, noting 
that these factors outweigh any potential damage to the relationship shared between 
the UK and Ireland.
183
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Ireland’s willingness to push this case to the point of a renewed inter-state action is 
indicative of the attitude that would likely prevail regarding any unilateral effort by the 
UK Government to resile from its GFA obligations. The request to re-open Ireland v UK 
can be read two ways. It might signal the continued commitment of the Government to 
the use of the inter-state process to ensure accountability for (the most egregious) 
human rights violations. On a more conservative reading, the Government’s request to 
re-open the case can be viewed as no more than a desire to ensure individual justice in 
individual (legacy) cases, in light of public pressure. 
 
The possibility of Ireland initiating a similar inter-state action regarding the scrapping of 
the Human Rights act therefore requires attention. An inter-state complaint related to 
the proposed human rights reforms could happen in two possible ways. The first, and 
more analogous to the Ireland v UK case, would be a case centred on a particular 
alleged violation. To provoke such a response from the Irish Government, it is likely that 
such a case would need to be demonstrably serious with some element of systematic 
abuse and/or connection to the conflict. The political justification for such a case within 
Ireland would be relatively simple; a grave case of alleged abuse, combined with a 
severely limited or no option for affected individuals to enforce their Convention rights, 
would be taken as requiring the intervention of the Irish state. This is the archetypal 
case of an inter-state complaint, with such cases generally ‘being instigated where the 
applicant state represents, or is closely connected with, the victims’.
184
 Even if the UK 
signalled its intention to withdraw from the ECHR, its obligations would continue to 
cover any human rights abuses until that withdrawal was effective.
185
  
 
There is also precedent for different type of case to be brought against the UK. In the 
context of the 1967 military coup in Greece, three countries (Norway, Sweden and the 
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Netherlands) brought an application under the European Convention.
186
 This case 
involved allegations of both specific violations, and of violations of the ECHR due to 
general legislative changes and ‘administrative measures’.
187
 This case demonstrates the 
capacity of inter-state complaints to invoke generalised or abstract complaints about 
the effect of national laws on aspects of a state’s ECHR obligations. Thus, whether an 
inter-state application is brought is contingent upon the strength of feeling within Irish 
Government circles regarding the changes to the Human Rights Act. It remains a crucial 
bargaining chip which the Irish Government can seek to use to influence the eventual 
form of human rights protection in Northern Ireland.  
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11. The European Union Dimension 
 
A recent and controversial
188
 opinion of the Court of Justice of the European Union
189
 
considered whether it was legally possible for the EU to become a party to the ECHR. 
The desire for the EU to sign up to the articles of the European Convention,
190
 followed 
extensive negotiations and an increasing emphasis on human rights in the EU.
191
 With 
the UK’s continued membership of the EU soon to be the subject of a referendum,
192
 
there is an important and complex overlap between the Conservative Government’s 
human rights plans and EU questions. The UK and Ireland’s relationship as ‘as partners 
in the European Union’ was as much a feature of the GFA arrangements as the ECHR.
193
 
As Mark Durkan has recognised in Parliament: 
 
[T]he institutions of the Good Friday agreement do not take as givens just the 
human rights provisions of the Human Rights Act and the European convention on 
human rights, but the common EU membership of the UK and Ireland.
194
 
 
If the UK were to remain in the EU, and if the EU were to successfully become a party to 
the ECHR, indirect human rights obligations would flow. These ECHR obligations would 
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be a consequence of the UK’s EU membership
195
 and not a consequence of the Human 
Rights Act or any replacement legislation. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper, the 
UK should seek a Bilateral Interpretive Agreement with Ireland in advance of any EU 
Referendum (as Ireland did with the 2004 citizenship referendum) to consider how UK 
withdrawal from the EU would impact upon the GFA arrangements. 
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12. Conclusions 
 
The Good Friday Agreement was not merely a Bilateral Treaty between the UK and 
Ireland. In providing the vehicle for a peace settlement it became part of the 
‘metaconstitutional discourse’ between the two countries.
196
 As such, it is unsurprising 
how the peace settlement anchored itself in the EU and ECHR as established examples 
of supranational arrangements overarching the relations between the UK and Ireland. A 
desire for an unalloyed version of national sovereignty underpins the aversion to the EU 
and ECHR fuels the current pressure for a “British” Bill of Rights and an EU Referendum. 
The GFA, however, presents no less of an affront to this vision of national sovereignty. 
Being of the same matter as these pan-European arrangements and weaving them into 
its terms, it should come as little surprise that human rights reform in the UK will engage 
the GFA and careful action will be required by the UK Government to abide by its terms. 
 
In the discussion above, Section One highlighted the centrality of human rights to the 
peace process in Northern Ireland, and how that centrality has co-existed with some 
disagreement between Northern Irish parties about the appropriate extent of human 
rights protections. A different set of diverging views were seen in respect of the reasons 
for the Human Rights Act’s repeal. The views of some who see the Human Rights Act as 
having an ‘ownership’ issue and the hostility towards the Act by some sections of the 
media and the Conservative party, were set alongside the misconceptions about human 
rights that have been promoted. The additional layer of difficulty added by the UK’s 
devolution settlements was also discussed. We argued that the differing views in the 
different regions and the Sewel convention requiring the consent of devolved 
administrations, would both add significant legal and political complexity. The very the 
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authority of the Northern Ireland Assembly to legislate is also bound up with its 
compliance with the ECHR. 
  
 
